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1International environmental agreements in the presence of adaptation
Abstract
We show that adaptive measures undertaken by countries in the face of climate change,
apart from directly reducing the damage caused by climate change, may also indirectly
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions by increasing the stable size of international agreements
on emission reductions. Moreover, we show that the more e⁄ective the adaptive measure
in terms of reducing the marginal damage from emissions, the larger the stable size of the
international environmental agreement. In addition, we show that larger coalitions, in the
presence of adaptation, may lead to lower global emission levels and higher welfare.
JEL Classi￿cations: Q54, Q59
Keywords: international environmental agreements, adaptation, coalition formation, cli-
mate change
21 Introduction
Countries around the world are currently actively pursuing two di⁄erent means of tackling
climate change. First, countries are attempting to mitigate emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHGs) through international negotiations. Second, countries are undertaking adaptive
measures to reduce the negative e⁄ects of climate change. The purpose of this paper is to
investigate whether the success of the ￿rst, in fact, depends on the latter. That is, does
adaptation a⁄ect the stable size of international environmental agreements (IEAs)?
An individual country￿ s emissions of GHGs causes a negative externality on other coun-
tries by exacerbating climate change. A country choosing its emission level non-cooperatively
(i.e. maximizing its individual welfare) would, therefore, over-pollute relative to the coop-
erative outcome (where each country maximizes joint welfare of all countries when choosing
its emission level). International cooperation to set emission levels has, thus, been a nat-
ural approach to alleviating climate change. However, some have argued that mitigation of
greenhouse gas emissions cannot be the only policy response to climate change because due
to the inertia of the climate system, even drastic emission reduction targets today would
not be su¢ cient to slow down global climate change. This has resulted, in recent years, in
countries increasingly undertaking adaptive measures to reduce the potential damage caused
by climate change induced catastrophes such as ￿ oods. A recent article in The Economist,
entitled "How to live with climate change: It won￿ t be stopped, but its e⁄ects can be made
less bad", captures the ongoing developments as follows "... in the wake of the Copenhagen
summit, there is a growing acceptance that the e⁄ort to avert serious climate change has run
out of steam... Acceptance, however, does not mean inaction. Since the beginning of time,
creatures have adapted to changes in their environment..."
The term "adaptation", within this context, refers to adjustments in ecological, social or
economic systems for reducing potential damage from climate change (Parry et al, 2007). It
is loosely de￿ned to cover a wide range of measures including the building of dykes or levees,
the changing of crop types and facilitating early storm warning.
3This paper asks whether such adaptive measures undertaken by countries increase or
decrease the number of countries that participate in a stable self-enforcing international en-
vironmental agreement. Given that adaptation reduces the marginal damage from pollution,
countries within and outside the IEA have an incentive to emit more in the presence of adap-
tation. This leads to the next question addressed by the paper. Are IEAs, for any given
coalition size, as e⁄ective in reducing global emissions as in the absence of adaptation? Or
does adaptation reduce the desirability of IEAs from the perspective of social welfare?
These questions gain importance in light of the persistent failure of countries to reach
binding commitments on emission targets, as embodied at the UN Climate Conferences held
in Kyoto in 1997 and Copenhagen in 2009, and the billions of dollars that governments are
setting aside for developing adaptive measures to safeguard against imminent damage from
climate change. Since adaptation generates public goods, we observe heavy intervention by
national governments and international organizations in the provision of adaptive measures.
Since 1980, the World Bank has approved more than 500 operations related to disaster
management, amounting to more than US$40 billion. Estimates provided by international
organizations of ￿nancial resources needed in developing countries for adaptation include:
$10 to $40 billion annually (World Bank, 2007), $50 billion annually (Oxfam International,
2007), $86 billion annually by 2015 (UNDP, 2007), $46 to $171 billion annually by 2030
(UNFCCC, 2007). Moreover, there exist several adaptation funds run by the UNFCCC,
World Bank and European Commission that have already contributed in the millions towards
adaptation.1
The existing literature on adaptation can be broadly categorized into two streams. The
1According to Le Goulven (2008), existing adaptation funds inlcude the following. The UNFCCC pledged
$50 million through the SPA (Strategic Priority ￿Piloting an Operational Approach to Adaptation￿ ) in 2001
of which $28 million had been committed and $14.8 million disbursed by 2008. The UNFCCC pledged
$165 million through the LDCF (Least Developed Countries Fund) in 2001 of which $59 million had been
committed and $9.8 million spent by 2008. The UNFCCC pledged $65 million through the SCCF (Special
Climate Change Fund) in 2001 of which $9 million had been committed and $1.4 million spent by 2008.
Also in 2001, the Kyoto Protocol set up an Adaptation Fund which pledged $160-950 million by 2012. In
2008, the World Bank￿ s Pilot Program for Climate Resilience under the Strategic Climate Fund pledged
$500 million. In 2007, the European Commission pledged EUR 50 million under the Global Climate Change
Alliance and the German Ministry of the Environment pledged EUR 60 million.
4￿rst provides a description of the tradeo⁄facing countries when deciding how to allocate re-
sources between mitigating GHG emissions and adapting to climate change (see for example,
Auerswald, Konrad and Thum, 2011; Buob and Stephan, 2009; Klein, Schipper, and Dessai,
2003 and 2005; Kane and Shogren, 2000; Kane and Yohe, 2000; Ingham, Ma, and Ulph,
2005; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2003; Tol, 2005). The second stream explicitly incorporates
adaptation in integrated assessment models to analyze the interaction between mitigation
and adaptation (see for example Bosello, 2004; De Bruin, Dellink, and Agrawala, 2009;
De Bruin, Dellink, and Tol, 2009). Other integrated assessment models such as MERGE
(Manne, Mendelsohn, and Richels, 1995), and RICE (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) implicitly
capture adaptation by incorporating the costs of adaptation in the regional damage function.
But none of these papers allow for coalition formation amongst the countries and therefore,
do not analyze the impact of adaptation on the stability of international environmental
agreements.
There also exists an established literature on the sustainability of international agree-
ments on emission reductions (including Barrett, 1994 and 2003; Breton, Sbragia and Zac-
cour, 2010; Breton et al, 2009; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Chander and Tulkens, 1995 and
1997; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 2006; Tulkens and Eyckmans, 1999; Finus and Rund-
shagen, 2001 and 2003; Hoel and Schneider, 1997; Petrosjan and Zaccour, 2003; Rubio and
Ulph, 2006 and 2007; de Zeeuw, 2008). However, these papers do not allow for countries to
engage in adaptation.
This paper intends to bridge the gap between these two streams of the existing literature
by setting up a game theoretic framework, which incorporates both adaptation and joining
an IEA as strategies available to countries dealing with climate change.
We use a membership game similar to Barrett (1994, 2003) to model international envi-
ronmental agreements. The stability concept used is ￿ la d￿ Aspremont et al. (1983) which
de￿nes stability in terms of immunity to unilateral deviations. This can be achieved only
when the coalition is internally stable with no country having an incentive to withdraw,
5and externally stable with no country having an incentive to further participate. Moreover,
we assume that the e⁄ect of adaptation is local whereas the damage caused by emissions
is global, in line with real examples of adaptive measures currently being undertaken by
di⁄erent countries. Our main contribution is to show that allowing for countries to engage
in costly adaptation activities increases the stable coalition size that is formed within this
framework. This is in sharp contrast to the ￿ndings of much of the existing IEA literature
which concludes that only very small coalitions are stable (see for example, Barrett, 1994
and 2003; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 2006). This paper provides a more positive result
by illustrating that if the countries involved negotiate not only on emission targets but also
on the level of adaptation, then it is possible to attract a greater number of countries to
commit to emission and adaptation levels that maximize the joint welfare of the coalition
members rather than individual welfare. The natural question that arises is whether such
IEAs, in the presence of adaptation, lead to greater or less emissions at the global level.
The answer is a priori ambiguous since, on the one hand, adaptation, by reducing marginal
damage from emissions, induces both countries within and outside the IEA to emit more.
On the other hand, since adaptation is a costly activity (see footnote 1), countries have an
incentive to jointly emit less to avoid these costs.
This leads to our second contribution which is to show that, within this context, larger
coalitions may lead to lower levels of total emissions and reduce total emissions below the
non-cooperative level, so that adaptation ultimately helps in two ways (i) ￿rst by directly
reducing the damage from climate change and (ii) second by indirectly causing countries to
mitigate emissions by reaching a larger stable IEA. This is again in contrast to the existing
IEA literature which does not account for adaptation and concludes that large coalitions,
even when stable, are typically "shallow", that is, they lead to more emissions than at the
non-cooperative equilibrium (Barrett, 1994 and 2003; Finus and Rundshagen, 2003). Thus,
adaptation, rather than merely being a substitute for the failed attempts at negotiating an
IEA, as suggested currently in The Economist (November 2010) and other media outlets,
6may actually foster international cooperation on mitigating emissions of GHGs.2 However,
we prescribe caution when interpreting this result since the possibility that a larger coalition
size leads to a shallow agreement is not completely excluded within our framework. Instead,
what we show is that by carefully choosing the "type" of adaptive measures undertaken, it
is possible for countries to achieve large coalitions that are not shallow.
Our results depend crucially on the type of adaptation used by countries. In particular,
our positive results only hold when the adaptive measure is able to signi￿cantly reduce the
marginal damage from emissions. In reality, the di⁄erent adaptive measures undertaken by
regions di⁄er signi￿cantly in their ability to reduce marginal damage from emissions.3 On
one extreme, consider carbon sequestration which simply reduces the amount of GHGs in
the atmosphere without a⁄ecting the marginal damage from emissions. On the other hand,
consider a levee which protects a coastal region repeatedly from an increasing onset of ￿ oods
caused by climate change. The latter clearly reduces the marginal damage of emissions. In
our model, the degree to which adaptation is able to reduce marginal damage from emissions
is captured by the parameter ￿: Thus, carbon sequestration would correspond to ￿ = 0 whilst
the levee would be associated with a ￿ > 0: An alternative interpretation of ￿ is the following.
Some adaptive measures require a high cost of implementation post-disaster whilst others
avoid this cost to society by preventing the disaster from occurring. The former type of
adaptation is represented, in this paper, by a low ￿ and the latter by a high ￿: According to the
Red Cross Climate Centre, every $1 invested before a disaster saves $4 afterwards. Examples
of the former, also known as reactive disaster management measures, include post-disaster
reconstruction projects such as reconstruction of physical infrastructure and ￿ ood evacuation
2Indeed, it seems that countries are realizing the importance of including adaptation in inter-
national negotiations, given the new "Cancun Adaptation Fund" that has been established at the
COP16 Meetings held at Cancun in December 2010. (UNFCCC Press Release, 11 December 2011,
http://unfccc.int/￿les/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/
pr_20101211_cop16_closing.pdf)
3For speci￿c examples, the reader may refer to the material presented at the Workshop on "The State of
International Climate Finance: Is it adequate and is it productive?", organized by the International Center
for Climate Governance, held in Venice, October 2010.
7schemes.4 Examples of the latter, also known as proactive disaster management measures,
include prevention measures, such as early warning measures and developing methods for
accurate risk assessments5, education campaigns, improvement of irrigation facilities in rural
areas, zoning, ￿ ood prevention mechanisms ranging from shore protection (building levees)
and terracing in rural areas6 to adaptation of production, and sound urban planning.7
Given the wide variety of adaptive measures that countries can choose to invest in, this
paper e⁄ectively provides a selection criterion. It emphasizes that countries bene￿t more
by choosing those types of adaptive measures that reduce marginal damage from emissions
the most (i.e. those associated with a high ￿): Implementing this type of adaptive mea-
sures results in larger stable IEAs which mitigate emissions. This is an important result
since, according to The Economist, 27 November 2010, as much as two-thirds of the damage
from climate change in terms of higher prices and lower growth worldwide cannot be o⁄set
through investment in adaptation alone. Therefore, it is a particularly desirable property
of adaptation that it can induce more mitigation of emissions of GHGs, under the right
4The World Bank has implemented post-disaster reconstruction projects in Argentina (e.g. The Argentina
Flood Rehabilitation Project), Brazil (e.g. The Rio Flood Reconstruction Prevention Project), Mexico and
India (e.g. Maharashtra Emergency Earthquake Rehabilitation Program). See Ranghieri (2010) for further
details.
5Example of early warning programs include The Early Warning System for Hydrogeologi-
cal Risk Monitoring and Forecast of Calabria Region (Italy) and the National Forecast Center
(Cuba). The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction includes The Hyogo
Framework for Action (HFA) monitoring tools for disaster risk reduction in the Europe region
(http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/hfamonitoring/).
The EU has its own program MOVE: Methods for the Improvement of Vulnerability Assessment in Eu-
rope. The UFZ ￿CapHaz-Net, RiskMap & ConHaz: Natural Hazards Management Projects in Germany
has similar objectives. There also exists the Capacity Building Program through DIANE-CM (Decentralised
Integrated Analysis and Enhancement of Awareness through Collaborative Modelling and Management of
Flood Risk) which aims to Integrate, Consolidate and Disseminate European Flood Risk Management Re-
search.
6Examples include proactive projects such as Coastal environmental preservation - mangrove planting:
Vietnam Red Cross, Focus on response preparedness: Bangladesh Red Crescent Society and FREEMAN:
Flood REsilience Enhancement and MANagement: a pilot study in Flanders, Germany and Italy.
7At the Mayors￿Summit in Copenhagen (December 2009), the Mayors￿Task Force on Urban Poverty
and Climate Change was formed and is actively helping cities like Dar es Salaam, Jakarta, Mexico City and
Sao Paulo (see Ranghieri (2010)). National and regional governments also have set up several intititutes to
prevent disasters such as the All India Disaster Mitigation Institute, and the ENSURE Program of the EU
for enhancing resilience of communities and territories facing natural hazards.
8conditions.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. Section 3 presents the
membership game used to analyze coalition formation. Section 4 presents the e⁄ect of
allowing for adaptation on the outcome of the game. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Let N = f1;:::ng denote the set of all countries. A by-product of the consumption and
production activities of each country is the emission of a global pollutant. Country i emits
ei ￿ 0 units of the pollutant with the aggregate emissions denoted by E =
Pn
i=1 ei. Each
country is also allowed to spend resources on adapting to the damage from pollution. The
level of adaptation chosen by country i is given by ai; and, in line with reality, is assumed
to reduce the e⁄ects of climate change for country i only:
Social welfare of each country is assumed to be given by the following:
w(E;ai) ￿ B (ei) ￿ D(E;ai) ￿ C(ai) (1)
where B (ei); D(E;ai) and C(ai) are given below by the (2); (3); and (4) respectively.
In (1); B (ei) represents the bene￿t to country i from its own emissions and is given by







with ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0: That is, B00 (ei) < 0:
In (1); D(E;ai) represents the damage to country i from pollution and is given by
D(E;ai) ￿ (!E ￿ ￿ai ￿ ￿aiE) (3)
with ! > 0; ￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ 0:8 From (3); the marginal damage from emissions is given by
8The tradeo⁄, in our damage function, between the levels of emission, E; and adaptation, ai; is similar
9@D(E;ai)
@E = ! ￿ ￿ai; which is decreasing in ￿: We also have that
@D(E;ai)
@ai = ￿(￿ + ￿E) < 0;
that is, pollution damage of country i is decreasing in the level of country ￿ {￿ s adaptation.





Henceforth in the paper, we distinguish between the "level" of adaptation, as denoted
by ai, and the "type" of adaptation, as denoted by ￿. Here a high (low) ￿ refers to those
"types" of adaptive measures that lead to a large (small) reduction in the marginal damage
of emissions. For example, consider two di⁄erent adaptive measures intended to protect
coastal regions from the e⁄ects of ￿ ooding caused by climate change: a ￿ ood evacuation
plan and the construction of levees. A ￿ ood evacuation plan has a low ￿ and building levees
has a high ￿: If an extra levee is built, each extra unit of emission is less damaging than if an
evacuation plan is put in place. Equivalently, for ￿ > 0; the marginal bene￿t of adaptation
is increasing in the level of aggregate emissions. That is, the higher is E; the greater the
bene￿ts to country i from having an extra levee (i.e. a higher ai), since the levee serves to
protect the country from a greater number of ￿ oods at a higher E:






That is, the cost of adaptation is strictly convex and increasing in ai:
Given this setting, we consider two possible scenarios. The ￿rst scenario is one where
the countries behave non-cooperatively. The objective of each country￿ s government is to
simultaneously choose ei and ai that maximize its own welfare taking as given the emissions
to that in the literature on multiple pollutants in the context of climate change, where some pollutants such
as CO2 increase global warming and others such as SO2 have a cooling e⁄ect (see, for example, Legras and
Zaccour (forthcoming)).
9In our model, the net cost of adaptation is given by the cost function, C (ai); less the bene￿t from
adaptation in terms of reduced damage, ￿ai + ￿aiE: Thus, our net cost of adaptation is decreasing in the
global emission level, E; for all ￿ > 0. This is analogous to the way in which cost of R&D has been modeled
by Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010) within the context of international cooperation on the development of clean
technologies, where the cost of R&D is decreasing in the level of R&D.




where w(E;ai) is given by (1):
The second scenario is one where the countries simultaneously choose ei and ai that





Henceforth, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1: We have that c￿ ￿ ￿ > 0:
Assumption 1 ensures that the cost of adaptation is su¢ ciently high such that the opti-
mization problem facing each country in either scenario, as given by (5) and (6); becomes
non-trivial within our framework.
The Noncooperative Equilibrium
In the noncooperative case, we maximize (5) with respect to ei and ai: From these we obtain
country ￿ {￿ s best response function, as given by the following:
ei =





Lemma 1: For c￿ > ￿
2; the emission strategies of countries are strategic complements, that
is, ei is increasing in ej; j 6= i:
Lemma 1 follows directly from (7); and is in contrast to the standard result in the exist-
ing IEA literature10 and much of the literature on noncooperative games of transboundary
pollution, where the emission strategies of countries are strategic substitutes. Thus, the
presence of adaptation may overturn a well-established result. In the absence of adaptation,
10See for example Barrett (1994), Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006).
11the only means available to country i of reducing damage in response to an increase in other
countries￿emissions is to decrease its own emissions. And thus, the emission strategies of
countries are strategic substitutes in the absence of adaptation. In this paper, we allow for
two alternate possibilities that country i can use to reduce its own damage when faced with
an increase in other countries￿emissions: either it can reduce its own emissions or it can
increase its level of adaptation. If country i chooses the latter option, it is possible that
country i simultaneously ￿nds it optimal to emit more in reaction to the increase in other
countries￿emissions.
Since the countries are identical, in the noncooperative equilibrium, each country chooses
emissions and adaptation given by:
enc =




￿￿ + n￿(￿ ￿ !)
c￿ ￿ n￿
2 (9)
The second order condition is satis￿ed since we have @2w
@e2
i = ￿￿ < 0; @2w
@a2















= (￿￿)(￿c) ￿ ￿ which is positive under Assumption 1.
The equilibrium level of emissions of each country, enc; is increasing in ￿ since, from (2) it
follows that each unit of emission yields higher bene￿ts at higher levels of ￿. The equilibrium
level of emissions of each country is decreasing in ! since each unit of emission generates
more damage at the margin the higher is !: Since the equilibrium level of emissions of each
country is lower at higher levels of !; it follows that equilibrium adaptation, anc; is also
lower at higher levels of !; as long as adaptation is su¢ ciently costly (i.e. c￿ ￿ n￿
2 > 0);
as shown by (9). This explains the a priori counter-intuitive e⁄ect of ! on anc; that is, the
noncooperative adaptation level is decreasing in !:
We note that both enc and anc are increasing in ￿: The intuition for this is the following.
For higher values of ￿; at the margin, adaptation leads to greater reductions in the marginal
damage from emissions. Therefore, countries have an incentive to adapt more. Also, by
12adapting more, countries can emit more, since each unit of emission is now less damaging.
Full Cooperation
In the cooperative equilibrium, each country chooses emissions and adaptation to maximize
(6) and these values are given by:
ec =




￿￿ + n￿(￿ ￿ n!)
c￿ ￿ n2￿
2 (11)
We note that both ec and ac are also increasing in ￿; similar to the result for enc and anc:
The second order condition is satis￿ed since we have @2w
@e2
i = ￿n￿ < 0; @2w
@a2















= (￿n￿)(￿nc) ￿ n2￿ which is positive under Assumption 1.
Furthermore, we have that (enc ￿ ec) and (anc ￿ ac) are given by
enc ￿ ec = c(n ￿ 1)








anc ￿ ac = n￿(n ￿ 1)







These are of the same sign, signifying that if adaptation is higher in one of the scenarios,
so are emissions. Moreover, it is possible that we get a dismal result whereby countries emit
more under full cooperation than under the non-cooperative equilibrium. This occurs if the
cost of adaptation, c, is su¢ ciently low, such that joint welfare is maximized if countries
emit more than under non-cooperation and simply adapt to the resulting damages.
For the extreme case where ￿ = ￿ = 0; we retrieve the game without any adaptation.11 In
this case, the equilibrium emissions under the non-cooperative equilibrium are higher than
under the cooperative equilibrium due to the standard free-riding e⁄ect, with enc ￿ ec =
(n￿1)!
￿ > 0:
11See for example, Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and others.
133 Coalition formation
Consider the scenario where the countries decide to form an international environmental
agreement. More speci￿cally, let S ￿ N countries sign an agreement while NnS do not.
We denote the size of coalition S by s and the total emission generated by the coalition by
Es = ses, where es is the emission of a representative signatory. Similarly, Ens = (n￿s)ens is
the total emissions generated by the complement of the coalition with ens being the emissions
generated by a representative non-signatory. The sum of the emissions of the signatory and
non-signatory countries, that is global emissions, is given by E = Es + Ens:
Following Barrett (1994), we assume that the nonsignatories behave noncooperatively
after observing the emission and adaptation choices of the signatories. The nonsignatories￿
maximization problem is given by (5) which results in the following best response function:
ei =








2 ; i 2 NnS;k 2 S (12)
By symmetry, from (12) we have that the best response of a non-signatory is given by:
ens (es) =
(￿ ￿ !)c + ￿￿ + ￿
2 (ses)
￿c ￿ ￿
2 (n ￿ s)
(13)









; i 2 NnS;k 2 S (14)
By symmetry, we have that the level of adaptation of each non-signatory country is given
by:
ans (es) =
￿ + ￿((n ￿ s)ens (es) + ses)
c
(15)
The signatories choose their emission and adaptation levels by maximizing their joint
welfare while taking into account the behavior of nonsignatories, as given by ens (es) and
14ans (es). That is, signatories choose es and as by solving the following maximization problem.
max
es;as
s[B (es) ￿ D[(n ￿ s)ens (es) + ses;as] ￿ C (as)] (16)
Henceforth, for analytical tractability, we set the following parameter values: n = 100;
￿ = ￿ = c = 1: Given these parameter values, we restrict our attention to values of ￿ that
satisfy Assumption 1 and the condition that c￿ > ￿
2 such that by Lemma 1, the emissions
strategies of countries are strategic complements. We have checked that the following results
hold for several other numerical examples that we have considered that also satisfy these
conditions.
Given that the signatory countries maximize (16); and given the best response functions
of the non-signatory countries as given by (13) and (15); we can derive the equilibrium values




ns which are functions of the
parameters s, ￿; ￿ and !:12 We note that if s = n; we revert to the full cooperative case,
that is, e￿
sjs=n = ec and a￿
sjs=n = ac. When s = 0; we revert to the non-cooperative case,
such that a￿
nsjs=0 = anc and e￿
nsjs=0 = enc:
The equilibrium global emissions, that is, the sum of emissions of all countries is given
by E￿ = se￿
s + (n ￿ s)e￿
ns: Also, the change in global emissions due to the formation of a
coalition of size s is given by ￿E = E￿ ￿ 100e￿
nc:13
























12For the complete functional forms please refer to A1-A4 in the Appendix.
13For the complete functional forms please refer to A5-A6 in the Appendix.
































In order to compute the stable size of the coalition we use the stability concept as presented
by d￿ Aspremont et al. (1983), where a coalition is stable if it is both internally and externally
stable. Formally, internal stability implies that: w￿
s (s) ￿ w￿
ns (s ￿ 1) for all i 2 S i.e. there
is no incentive for any one member to leave the coalition, where w￿
s (s) is de￿ned by (17) and
w￿
ns (s ￿ 1) is derived from (18) by replacing s by (s ￿ 1). External stability implies that
w￿
ns (s) ￿ w￿
s (s + 1) for all i 2 NnS; i.e. there are no further incentives for any non-member
to join the coalition, where w￿
ns (s) is de￿ned by (18) and w￿
s (s + 1) is derived from (17)
by replacing s by s + 1. For the purpose of our analysis, it is useful to de￿ne the stability
function as in Hoel and Schneider (1997), which is represented by the following:
￿i (s) = w
￿
s (s) ￿ w
￿
ns (s ￿ 1): (19)
Internal stability of a coalition of size s implies that
￿i(s) ￿ 0 8i 2 S; (20)
and external stability of a coalition of size s implies that
￿i(s + 1) < 0 8i 2 NnS: (21)
16We say that s￿ is the stable size of the coalition S if s￿ satis￿es both (20) and (21) simul-
taneously. This implies that s￿ is the largest integer equal to or smaller than the value at
which the stability function ￿ becomes null and is decreasing around this value.
4 IEAs in the presence of adaptation
We proceed to examine the stability function for di⁄erent values of ￿: We begin with the
benchmark case where ￿ = 0 and then analyze the case where ￿ is strictly positive.
Proposition 1: For ￿ = 0 and for all ￿ ￿ 0; the stable size of the coalition is given by
s￿ = 3:










with ￿i (2)j￿=0 > 0; ￿i (3)j￿=0 = 0 and ￿i (4)j￿=0 < 0: Thus, Proposition 1 follows directly
from (22):￿
As per Proposition 1, we revert to the ￿ puzzle of small coalitions￿found in the literature
on environmental membership games where it is indicated that the stable size is between 2
and 4 as is the case in Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), De Cara and Rotillon (2001), Finus
and Rundshagen (2001), and Rubio and Casino (2001) among others. Proposition 1 consists
of the two following cases.
4.1 Case 1: No adaptation (￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0)
The scenario where ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0 represents the benchmark case where countries do not




c = 0; since adaptation is completely ine⁄ective
in reducing pollution damage.
174.2 Case 2: Adaptation without interaction (￿ = 0 and ￿ > 0)
When ￿ = 0; then there is no interaction in the damage function between emissions and
adaptation. This, together with ￿ > 0; implies that adaptation becomes equivalent to
negative emissions in the damage function. An example of this is carbon sequestration.
In this case; the equilibrium level of adaptation is equal to the marginal e¢ ciency of
adaptation in reducing pollution damage in all scenarios (that is, regardless of coalition









c = ￿ > 0
The stability function is identical to that in Case 1, as given by (22):
Indeed, without interaction between emissions and adaptation, the tradeo⁄ between the
two becomes a non-strategic issue, that is, a given country￿ s adaptation cannot a⁄ect the
emission strategies of other countries.
Proposition 1 relates to the scenario where ￿ = 0 and shows that adaptation, in this case,
does not a⁄ect the stable size of IEAs: That is, regardless of the level of adaptation, the
stable size is small, in line with the existing literature on IEAs. The next question addressed
in the paper is whether this result carries over to the case where ￿ is strictly positive.
4.3 Case 3: Adaptation with interaction (￿ > 0 and ￿ ￿ 0)
When ￿ > 0; there exists an interaction between emissions and adaptation in the damage
function. The scenario where ￿ > 0 and ￿ ￿ 0 an interesting case arises, which is in contrast
to the small coalition puzzle of Cases 1 and 2. First, we show that the sign of the stability
function is independent of the values of ￿ and ! (See Appendix). We then report our results
on the stable size of the coalition as ￿ varies in Table 1. Note that Table 1 is valid for all
possible combinations of parameters ￿ and !. We have checked that it is always possible
to ￿nd combinations of ￿ and ! such that es (s￿); ens (s￿); as (s￿) and ans (s￿) are strictly
18positive for the combinations of ￿ and s￿ that are reported in Table 1.14
Table I: Stable size; s￿; as ￿ varies (n=100)
￿ 0:01 0:02 0:05 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8
s￿ 3 3 3 6 10 15 21 28 34 41
Proposition 2: The stable coalition size, s￿; is increasing in ￿:
Proposition 2 indicates that an increase in ￿, increases the stable size s￿; as shown in Table
I.
In the existing IEA literature (without adaptation), it is well-established that the free-
riding incentives are weaker when the marginal damage from emissions is smaller. This
is because countries within the coalition realize that in the cooperative equilibrium they
can emit more. Since adaptation reduces the marginal damage from emissions, one might
expect that this prevents countries from free-riding which results in larger stable coalition
as per Proposition 2. However, this explanation of Proposition 2 would also imply that the
emissions of member countries increase as ￿ increases. By Lemma 1, this would further
imply that global emissions, E￿; increases as ￿ increases. Our next step is to verify if this is
necessarily the case in the presence of adaptation.
14See Table A1 in the Appendix for further details of the ranges of ￿ and ! for which the non-negativity
constraints are satis￿ed.
19Table II: Stable size; s￿; global emissions; E￿; and global welfare; W￿; as ￿ varies for n=100; ￿=1; !=60
￿ s￿ E￿ W ￿
0.2 6 2118:3 ￿3:7 ￿ 106
0.3 10 759:9 ￿1:9 ￿ 106
0.4 15 400:5 ￿1:1 ￿ 106
0.5 21 248:7 ￿7:1 ￿ 105
0.6 28 169:8 ￿4:9 ￿ 105
0.7 34 122:6 ￿3:6 ￿ 105
0.8 41 91:5 ￿2:7 ￿ 105
Result 1: For ￿ > 0:1; the equilibrium level of global emissions, E￿; is decreasing in ￿:
Result 1 follows from Table II. It is important because scientists working on climate
change have traditionally held the view that adaptation will lead to greater levels of global
emissions, thus increasing the risk of climate change induced catastrophes. Result 1, however,
shows that the opposite may occur. That is, adaptation may indirectly reduce the equilibrium
level of global emissions by causing larger IEAs to achieve stability.
Moreover, Result 1 shows that the explanation behind Proposition 2 that is provided
by the existing literature to explain the positive relationship between free-riding incentives
and marginal damage from emissions is not applicable in our model. Our model provides an
alternative intuition behind large stable coalitions and low marginal damage from emissions
when the low marginal damage is caused by adaptation. This stems from two key features
in our framework: (i) emission strategies of countries are strategic complements for ￿ > 0, as
shown by Lemma 1; (ii) the signatories act as a Stackelberg leader in the membership game.
The latter feature implies that the signatories take into account whilst deciding their own
emission strategies that if they increase emissions then so will the non-signatories. Therefore,
they have an incentive to emit less compared to the case where ￿ = 0: This, in our model,
20leads to lower global emissions with coalition formation as long as ￿ > 0; as summarized by
Result 1.
Result 2: For ￿ > 0:1; the equilibrium level of global welfare, W ￿; is increasing in ￿:
The existing literature on IEAs shows that within the context of membership games
similar to the one used in this paper, it is ambiguous whether welfare improves as coalitions
are formed and enlarged. Hence the importance of Result 2 which shows that in the presence
of adaptation, it is possible that larger coalitions do lead to increases in global welfare. The
presence of adaptation raises the following question, a priori. Does adaptation, by reducing
the damage from emissions, reduce the desirability of larger IEAs from a social welfare
perspective? In fact, Result 2 shows that this is not the case. The higher is ￿ (i.e. the more
e⁄ective is adaptation); and the larger is the corresponding size of the stable IEA, the higher
the global welfare level.
Although Table II illustrates Results 1 and 2 for ￿ = 1 and ! = 60; we have checked
that the same result holds qualitatively for several other combinations of ￿ and !:15 Results
1-2 together show that if countries choose adaptive measures that have a high ￿; then the
formation of larger stable IEAs is facilitated. Moreover, achieving lower global emissions and
higher global welfare becomes more likely than in the absence of adaptation.
Next, we compare the total emissions under coalition formation against the non-cooperative
benchmark. Our results are summarized in Table III, which shows the ranges of ! for which
total emissions falls as a result of the formation of an IEA of size s￿; i.e. ￿E < 0. Note that
in Table III, the ranges of ! satisfy the non-negativity constraints as summarized in Table
A1 in the Appendix. The results are valid for all ￿ > 0:16
15We have chosen to present that case where ! = 60 because this satis￿es the non-negativity contraints of
all quantities for all the di⁄erent values of ￿ considered in Table 2, in line with Table A1 in the Appendix.
16See Table A1 in the appendix for further details regarding the parameter values for which all equilibrium
quantities are non-negative.
21Table III. Reduction in emissions, ￿E<0
s￿ ￿ !
3 0:05 0:2 < ! < 1:75
6 0:2 2 < ! < 3:75
10 0.3 3 < ! < 9
15 0.4 6 < ! < 16
21 0.5 12 < ! < 25
28 0.6 21 < ! < 36
34 0.7 37 < ! < 47
41 0.8 57 < ! < 63
Result 3: For ￿ > 0; it is possible to have large stable coalitions that reduce total emissions
relative to non-cooperation.
Table III shows that when we account for adaptation with ￿ > 0; there exist a range
of intermediate values of ! for which the formation of large stable coalitions reduces total
emissions and at the same time satis￿es the non￿ negativity constraints. This result is in
contrast to the argument about large coalitions being "shallow", as presented by Barrett
(2003) and Finus and Rundshagen (2003).17 However, for ￿ > (<)0:1 and su¢ ciently large
(small) !; the change in global emissions due to coalition formation is positive. Indeed, this
is a dismal result where a large agreement is stable but does not achieve emission reduction.
5 Concluding remarks
According to The Economist (27 November 2010), "the green pressure groups and politicians
who have driven the debate on climate change have often been loth to see attention paid to
adaptation, on the ground that the more people thought about it, the less motivated they
17Note that these papers set up repeated games to model the incentives of countries to unilaterally deviate
from an IEA. They do not model adaptation.
22would be to push ahead with emissions reduction." We show in this paper that adaptation
does not necessarily lead to increased emissions. On the contrary, adaptation by countries
to climate change may induce the formation of larger stable IEAs which ultimately result in
lower global emission and higher global welfare.
Moreover, we show that this positive outcome is more likely to occur the greater the
degree to which the adaptive measure reduces marginal damage from emissions. Therefore,
it is not only the amount of adaptation undertaken by countries in equilibrium that matters
for the stability of IEAs, but also the "type" of adaptation, as captured by our parameter
￿: This suggests that when international negotiations are held, it is important for countries
to actively cooperate not only on reducing emissions, but also on the type as well as level
of adaptive measures to undertake. A priori it is unclear why countries should cooperate
on domestic policies to undertake adaptation which only reduce the damage from emissions
locally and have no direct e⁄ect on the damage su⁄ered by other countries. This paper
illustrates that although the direct e⁄ect of adaptation may indeed be local, adaptation
undertaken by an individual country/region may still have externalities on other countries
by indirectly a⁄ecting the equilibrium level of global emissions.
In the current paper, we have analyzed the case of identical countries. In reality dif-
ferent regions are vulnerable to di⁄erent degrees to the e⁄ects of climate change and will
therefore undertake di⁄erent amounts/types of adaptation, for example, Southern Europe is
expected to be a⁄ected more than Northern Europe by climate change. Therefore, allowing
for asymmetries across countries would be a useful extension.
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Equilibrium outcomes under coalition formation
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From (A1) and the non-signatories￿reaction function, as given by (13), we have
ens =
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From (A2) and (15), we have
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From (A1) and (13); the equilibrium global emissions, that is, the sum of emissions of
all countries is given by
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29From (A5) and (8); we have that the change in global emissions due to coalition formation
is given by
￿E = E ￿ 100enc (A6)
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We note that the sign of the stability function is independent of the parameters ! and ￿:
This follows directly from (A7):
31Non-negativity constraint
Table A1: Range of ! such that non-negativity is satis￿ed
￿ s￿ !
0.01 3 0<! < 0:5
0.02 3 0<! < 1
0.05 3 0<! < 1:75
0.2 6 ! >2
0.3 10 ! >3
0.4 15 ! >6
0.5 21 ! >12
0.6 28 ! >21
0.7 34 ! >37
0.8 41 ! >57
Table A1 shows the ranges of ! for which the equilibrium levels of emissions and adap-
tation in all scenarios are non-negative for all ￿ > 0. We use these parameter values to
generate Tables 1-3.
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